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ARTICLES
Renegotiating Previous Governments'
Privatization Deals: The 1997 U.K.




I. Ex-POST CHANGE OF PRIVATIZATION DEALS: THE UK WINDFALLS
LEVY PROJECT
Governments everywhere have the propensity to revoke deals made by
their predecessors if these deals look too good to the other party.' They
* Jean-Monnet Professor of European Energy and Economic Law (1994-99), and
Executive Director, Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law & Policy (CEPMLP),
University of Dundee, Scotland.
'" Lecturer in Law, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria. This work forms part of a series of
studies on stabilization clauses (TEx. INT'L L.J., 1996), investment arbitration (Arbitration
International, 1996); Energy Charter Treaty investment regime (J. World Trade, 1995);
expropriatory environmental regulation (ICQL, 2000); regulatory risk and international
treaties (World Bank Conference, September 1999); confiscatory taxation; renegotiation of
investment agreements; role of law and contract in international business.
I The renegotiations (some forced-upon the foreign investors) of investment agreements
in the 1970s and 80s were mostly initiated by host governments who sought to justify their
actions under the principles of change in circumstances and permanent sovereignty. But the
underlying factor in most cases was that the agreement had turned out to benefit the foreign
investor in a manner that was never contemplated at the time the agreement was signed. For
account of some of such renegotiations in the mineral industry. See WOLFGANG PETER,
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usually do not revoke deals that have turned out to be dismal failures.
Privatization falls under this category:2 Either the price paid by
purchasers/investors looks, ex post, too good -- thus providing an easy
argument for revoking such deals; or it does not look too good and the
purchasers/investors overpaid. Governments tend to leave these deals
alone. A normal seller will rarely be able to extract a higher price for an
asset sold if the assets turns out to be more profitable than expected, but
governments have the sovereign power of taxation at their hand to re-make
earlier deals, usually by a previous government.3 General public opinion
will usually be very sympathetic since "fat cats" are seen to need skinning.
The ex-ante situation with its attendant uncertainty and risk, which usually
explains whatever price was paid, is no longer in people's mind. The fact
that there was a risk and that the risk may not have materialized is as a rule
forgotten.
ARBITRATION AND RENEGOTIATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 51-127
(Kluwer Law International, 2d ed., 1995); DANIEL YERGrN, THE PRIZE (Simon & Schuster
1991); Thomas W. Waelde & Abba Kolo, Renegotiations and Contract Adaptation in the
International Investment Projects: Applicable Legal Principles and Industry Practices (1999)
(unpublished paper, on file with author -- a preliminary version may be found in Volume IV
of CEPMLP's Online Journal at <http://www.cepmlp.org>); Abba Kolo, Between
Legitimate Regulation and Taking of Foreign-Owned Property under International Law with
Particular Reference to the Jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Ch. 4
(1994) (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Dundee) [hereinafter Kolo].
IThis is exemplified by the failed renegotiations between BHP Petroleum and
PetroVietnam over the Dai Hung petroleum development project. The initial estimate by the
company of the total reserves (upon which the contract was based) turned out to be over
optimistic. Demands by the company for renegotiations of the agreement were resisted by
the Vietnamese as a result of which the company withdrew from the project. See THE
OILMAN WEEKLY, Oct. 2, 1995, at 5; THE OILMAN WEEKLY, Jul. 15, 1996, at 8; THE OILMAN
WEEKLY, Dec. 2, 1996, at 4; THE OILMAN WEEKLY, Feb. 2, 1997, at 5; THE OILMAN
WEEKLY, Feb. 24, 1997, at 4; THE OILMAN WEEKLY, Jun. 23, 1997, at 5. A similar
protracted renegotiations between Colombia and BP Oil company over the Piedemonte oil
fields as a result of poor geological results from explorations carried out by the company
lasted for four years before the Colombian government finally agreed to the company's
demand for renegotiations. See THE WEEKLY PETROLEUM ARGUS, Sept. 16, 1996;
PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, Mar. 1997, at 50; THE WEEKLY PETROLEUM ARGUS, Feb. 19, 1997,
at 5; THE WEEKLY PETROLEUM ARGUS, Apr. 7, 1997, at 5; PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, Jan.
1998, at 6; WEEKLY GAS INTELLIGENCE, Jan. 16, 1998, at 2; THOMAS W. WAELDE & ABBA
KOLO, RENEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACT ADAPTATION (1999).
' It is generally accepted under international that the right to impose taxes on nationals
and aliens alike (subject to treaty obligations - such as under a double taxation agreement, a
Bilateral Investment Treaty -- BIT, the EU Treaty, and NAFTA) is part of sovereignty of
every state. However, such powers may also be limited by general principles of
international, such as the requirement of non-discrimination and prohibition on confiscatory
taxes. A. ALBRECHT, THE TAXATION OF ALIENS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW; KEES VAN
RAAD, NON-DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 15 (Kluwer Law & Taxation
Publishers, Series on International Taxation No. 6, 1986).
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In the old days, right-wing governments sometimes privatized and
left-wing governments often re-nationalized.4  They had to pay
compensation -- under national law for nationals, usually more, under
international law obligations protecting foreign investment, to foreigners.'
There was much debate on nationalization and compensation with Third-
World radicals in the bygone days of the 1970s formulating innovative
concepts of "excessive profits" to reduce compensation.6 The prevailing
consensus at this time, expressed in about 1,200 bilateral investment
treaties' and the main modem multilateral investment treaties, such as the
North-American Free Trade Agreement and the 1994 Energy Charter
'In Britain, for instance, the Labour Party has historically and ideologically been
associated with nationalization or public ownership much more than the other political
parties despite the fact that the Conservative Party have had their share of nationalizations.
See C. FOSTER, PRIVATIZATION, PUBLIC OWNERSHIP AND THE REGULATION OF NATURAL
MONOPOLY 70-86 (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1992).
According to one study on nationalisation, a political party which has the concept of
central state control of the economy as its core ideology is more likely to embark on
nationalisation than a neo-liberal part. See Stephen J. Kobrin, Foreign Enterprise and
Forced Divestment in LDCs, 34 INT'L ORG. 65, 65-69 (1980); Isi FOIGHEL,
NATIONAUZATION: A STUDY IN THE PROTECTION OF AuEN PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
25-28 (Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1957); Kolo, supra note 1, at 112-13. This is supported by
history if one notes for instance, the "collectivisation" programme of the Bolsheviks after
the 1917 revolution in the former Soviet Union, the Cuban nationalization in the 1960s, and
Allende's nationalization of major industries in Chile in 1970. See HENRY J. STNER ET AL.,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 466-68 (University Casebook Series, The Foundation
Press, Inc, 4th ed., 1994). However, in some cases nationalism and ethnic chauvinism have
been the major motivating factors. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a
Bilateral Investment Treaty, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 621, 621-23 (1998); Amy L. Chua, The
Privatisation-Nationalisation Cycle: The Link between Markets and Ethnicity in Developing
Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 223-37 (1995).
1 Trustees of the Late Duke of Westminster's Estate v. UK, 5 EHRR 40 (1983)
[hereinafter James Case]; Lithgow v. UK 8 EHRR 329 (1986); MAURICE MENDELSON, THE
UNITED KINGDOM NATIONALISATION CASES AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, 57 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 33 (1986); R. HIGGINS, THE TAKING OF PROPERTY BY THE
STATE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 176 RDC-Collected Courses (1982-
III) 259, 359-64; J. G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 194-96 (Manchester University Press 1988).
6 See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 403-11
(1994); see also RICHARD LiLLICH, THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 95 (1972).
7 See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 97-117
(1995); Mohamed I. Khalil, Treatment of Foreign Investment in Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 7 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. (1992); but see SORNARAJAH, supra note
6, at 253-60; M. SORNARUJAH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES, 20 J.W.T.L. 79 (1986); Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt
Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639
(1986).
'See generally Richard G. Dearden, Arbitration of Expropriation Disputes between an
Investor and the State Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 29 J.W.T. 113
(1995); Rex J. Zedalis, Claims by Individuals in International Economic Law: NAFTA
Developments, 7 AM. REV. INT'L. AR. 115 (1996).
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Treaty, is that nationalization requires full, prompt and effective
compensation. 9
Notably, privatization of former public-service companies (often
before and sometimes after in monopoly form) leads to a more
sophisticated ball game: The value of the asset depends very much on the
relevant industry regulation, since regulators can increase the value or
decrease it depending on the ceiling they set for prices and other conditions
of service and competition. In addition, taxes increase or lower the value
of such assets, in particular if such taxes are not uniformly imposed
throughout a nation, but aimed in particular at the privatized and regulated
utility companies. Investment in privatized utilities therefore leads to a
very particular form of political risk -- the risk that regulatory conditions
change and special taxes are imposed, all measures within the sovereign
powers of the state.' ° The normal forms of protection against political risk
(investment insurance, stabilization clauses, international investment
treaties and international arbitration clauses) have not yet caught up with
the emergence of new forms of political risk.
9 See Patrick M. Norton, Back to the Future: Expropriation on the Energy Charter
Treaty, in THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: AN EAST-WEsT GATEWAY FOR INVESTMENT AND
TRADE 365 (Thomas W. Waelde ed., 1996); M. Somarajah, Compensation for
Nationalization: The Provision in the Energy Charter, in THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY:
AN EAST-WEST GATEWAY FOR INVESTMENT AND TRADE 386 (Thomas W. Waelde ed., 1996);
Charles Leben, Retour sur la notion de contrat d'etat et sur le droit applicable a celui-ci, in:
Melanges offerts a Hubert Thierry, Paris, Pedone 1998, 248.
" This is particularly so in relation to investing in the British privatization process
because of the then deep-rooted Labour Party opposition of the project and their threat to re-
nationalize some of the privatized industries with little or no compensation. It was not until
1992 when the Party softened its position on privatization by pledging to impose windfall
tax on the privatized utilities instead of renationalization as previously stated. See The
Economist, September 2, 1995, p. 24; L. Chennells, The Windfall Tax, 18 Fiscal Studies
(1997) 279, 280; David Currie, Regulating Utilities: The Labor View, in REGULATING
UTILITIES: BROADENING THE DEBATE (M. E. Beesley ed., 1997).
" Of the so many writings on political risk hardly any seems to have touched on this
particular issue. Instead, they have concentrated on the traditional kinds of risk and how to
manage them. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 6, at 323-37, BESANT-JONEs & HYLAN,
MANAGING RISKS OF INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (The World Bank, Washington
D.C., 1992); FARIBORz GHADAR, STEPHEN J. KOBRIN & THEODORE H. MORAN, MANAGING
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RISK: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES (1983); D. Frecker, Coping
with Political Risk, Australian Mining & Petroleum Law Assoc. Yearbook (1991) 507; H.
Zakariya, Political Risks of Transnational Petroleum Investment: The Mitigating Role of
National and International Insurance Programmes, I 1 NRF (1987) 165. Most recently:
Conference Proceedings of World Bank conference on infrastructure risk, September 1999.
See <http://www.worldbank.org/riskconference>.
However, a move towards that direction could be discerned from the proposed
Multilateral Agreement on Investment being negotiated by the OECD. The text of the
negotiation document provides for the national and MFN treatments to investors from
member states who wished to invest in any member country's privatisation programme. It
follows from this that when such investments are made they shall be accorded protection
against expropriation or similar measures under the Agreement. See Riyaz Datty & John.
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The 1997 UK windfall tax announced by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer in that year's budget speech is a case in point. 2 This issue is
not limited purely to the contemporary UK situation, but illustrates a
structural situation which can, and is likely to be repeated wherever utilities
are privatized, regulated and exposed to special industry taxes. 3 Such
actions are usually undertaken by a new government composed of parties
hitherto opposed to privatization, which will be able to combine its
previous opposition, and the values therein articulated with the ever present
need of governments for new revenue to finance its political popularity
objectives. This paper surveys shortly the possible responses by
international law, mainly principles and practice of international
investment protection, to situations which have recently arisen in the world
privatization laboratory (the UK) and situations which are likely to arise in
the many countries which currently copy the UK privatization model, once
new governments come to power. The UK situation is of particular interest
since in the absence of constitutional, federal or judicial constraints the
prevailing concept of parliamentary supremacy means that any legal
recourse can only be had from external sources of law.'4
Boscariol, A Quick Primer on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 27 INT'L. Bus.
LAW. 50, 51-52.
12 In his budget speech on July 2, 1997, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown,
announced that the "one-off' windfall tax on the privatized "utilities" was expected to raise
up to £5.2 billion to fund the government's back-to-work welfare programme aimed at
getting the long-term unemployed youth back to work. "Privatised utilities" was broadly
defined to include all firms privatized by flotation and regulated by relevant privatization
statutes. The definition included companies such as BT, BAA, and Power Gen which
operate in competitive markets; Railtrack, the privatized electricity companies (excluding
National Grid) and the privatized water companies. The basis of calculating the tax was the
difference between a firm's flotation price and a multiple of its average profits in the four
years after privatization. See Where the Windfall Blows, THE ECONOMIST, July 5, 1997, at
58; see Chennells, supra note 10.
,3 Perhaps no where might this be expected as in Russia and the former Communist
countries of Eastern Europe where privatizations have not been transparent and allegations
of corruption, fueled by the economic crisis are ripe. See Second Thoughts about
Privatiztions, PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, Mar. 1996, at 43; Oil Industry Privatisation, Russian
Style, PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, Feb. 1996, at 3; Grigory Yavlinsky, Russia's Phony
Capitalism, 77 FOREIGN AFFAIRS May/June 1998, at 67. Similar misgivings have been
expressed elsewhere - notably, in Latin America. See A Very Dig Deal, THE ECONOMIST,
Dec. 6, 1997, at S9. T. Waelde and C von Hirschhausen, Legislative Reform in the Energy
Industry of Post-Soviet Societies, in: R. Seidman, A.Seidman and T. Waelde, Making
Development Work: Legislative Reform for Good Governance, Kluwer, London 1999.
" Although the lack of "written" constitution gives the British government a lot of
flexibility in economic matters generally and in pursuing the privatisation programme in
particular, nonetheless, that discretion is constrained by external laws. See Terence Daintith
& Monica Sah, Privatisation and the Economic Neutrality of the Constitution, Pub. L. 465,
467 (1993); These are: the EU laws which take precedence over member states national
laws, the European Convention on Human Rights, multilateral and bilateral treaties. See
RAYMOND YOUNGS, ENGLISH, FRENCH AND GERMAN COMPARATIVE LAW 13, 16 (1998);
COSMO GRAHAM & TONY PROSSER, PRIVATISINO PUBLIC PUBLIC ENTERPRISES:
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II. THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS
PRACTICE
International law does not work like normal national law because it
does not rely on national judges, police and bailiffs. Instead, international
law acts like a social code of rules the breach of which affects a state's
reputation, makes it more difficult for such state to do normal business
with other states and companies. States found in breach of international
law by a consensus of the international law community and conferences,
arbitration tribunals and the International Court of Justice rarely comply.
Breaching states usually protest on the basis that their sovereignty is being
violated and that they have been subjected to the bias of the rest-of-the-
world against them. However, after agitation and excitement has worn out,
there is usually an attempt by the state and its elites responsible for dealing
with the world to come back into the fold. International law then becomes
effective by much quieter, face-saving diplomacy and on in-depth
inspection one will often find that international law is ultimately and in
effect complied with. 5
This is why it is important to examine the rules that may be applicable
and their way of being raised, adjudicated and enforced. Unfortunately for
the lay observer, these rules are rarely clear. They are usually a
combination of quite open-ended standards and criteria, which will only
acquire a definitive scope and meaning as they are debated and applied in
the particular case. Also, international law needs a plaintiff to become
effective. Usually, plaintiffs were the home states of affected investors. 6
Increasingly, private parties, mainly companies, have become entitled to
litigate before non-national tribunals against the offending state.' 7 This is
not without risk: It requires large resources of money and executive
attention. Suing a state also means getting exposed to the risk of being
blacklisted and sanctioned in manifest and subcutaneous ways at the
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND REGULATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1991); A.
Davis, Windfall Tax and the Law, THE TAX JOURNAL, Oct. 19, 1995, at 14.
5 Waelde, Role of Law and Contract in International Business, CEPMLP online journal:
<http://www.cepmlp.org>.
6 See Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain) 1970
I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5); Electronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20);
IAN BROWNLIE, THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 48 (1998); MARTIN DIXON,
T xTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (Blackstone Press, London, 1990); IGNAZ SEDL-
HOHENVELDERN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (1989); G. Abi-Sa'ab, The International
Law of Multinational Corporations: A Critique of American Legal Doctrine, 2 Annuals of
Int'l. Stud. (1971) 97, 101-4.
" This is mostly brought about by recognition of such private right of action against the
state in BITs an multilateral treaties and conventions such as NAFTA, the ECT and the
ICSID Convention. See AAPL v. Sri Lanka, 30 I.L.M. 577 (1991). The ICSID Convention
gives a direct right of action to the foreign investor against the host state and so also does
NAFTA and the ECT. See Nassib G. Zaide, Some Recent Decisions in ICSID Cases, 6
ICSID Rev.-FOREIGN IN VESTMRNT L. J. (1991) 514, 515 (1991); see Zedalis, supra note 8, at
116, 119.
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disposal of the regulating, permitting, awarding and taxing state
machinery." Consequently, international law plays a low-profile role in
negotiation between a state political and bureaucratic machinery keen on
avoiding political embarrassment and loss of face and affected investors
worried over the state's ability to penalize private companies foolhardy
enough to challenge the state. Its effect will consist in providing a set of
standards in such negotiations. Although none of the affected companies
mounted any legal challenge against the windfall tax as some seemed to
have suggested before the announcement, nonetheless the case did raise
important legal issues which merit consideration. One of such issues is
what are the possible legal grounds upon which to challenge the levy?
H. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The first legal instrument to think of in the current UK context is the
European Convention on Human Rights. It allows not only foreign
investors, but also British companies to raise a complaint before the
Strasbourg-based European Commission and Court of Human Rights (not
to be confused with the Luxembourg-based European Court of Justice, the
judicial organ of the European Communities). In the absence of a UK
constitution, the Convention operates so far as a quasi-constitutional
constraint of last resort in the UK.' The First Protocol, Article 1 of the
Convention, guarantees the "peaceful enjoyment of possessions," subject to
public interest, with reference to international law and subject to regulation
of property for the public interest and to "secure the payment of taxes."
The Convention witnesses the strong pro-state and social philosophies
prevailing after World War II. It provides wide latitude to the state for
regulating property, for exercising political judgment and, as the decades of
18 During the 1975 petroleum licensing "renegotiations" between the UK government
and oil companies, it was made clear to the companies that any resistance to the
government's demands might jeopardice the resisting company's prospects in future
licensing rounds and that warninG did influence the companies attitude towards the
negotiations. See PETER D. CAMERON, PETROLEUM RIGHTS AND SOVEREIGN RIGHTS: THE
CASE OF NORTH SEA OIL (Z. Bankowski et al. eds., 1983); see Terence Daintith & Ian Gault,
Pacta Sunt Servanda and the Licensing and Taxation of North Sea Oil Production, 8
CAMBRIAN L. REV. 27, 37 (1977); HIGGINS, supra note 5, at 351; on other similar
renegotiations, see Kolo, supra note 1.
19 For a succinct analysis of Art. 1, Additional Protocol: Luigi Condorelli, Premier
Protocole Additionel in: Pettiti, La Convention Europeenne des Droits de lHomme,
Economica Paris 1992; M. Frigo Le Limitazioni al diritto di proprieta e al"esercizio delle
attivita economiche nella giurisprudenza della corte di giustizia, 34 Rivista di diritto
intemazionale privato e processuale, 51-78 (1998) Now that the Convention has to a large
been incorporated into UK law under The Human Rights Act 1998, it means most of the
rights guaranteed under the Convention may be enforced in UK domestic courts. The
incorporation of the Convention was one of Labour Parties election pledges. See K.D.
Ewing, The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy, 62 MOD. L. REV. 79, 81-82
(1999); Jack Straw & Paul. Boateng, Bringing Rights Home: Labour's Plans to Incorporate
the ECHR into UK Law, 1997 EuR. HuM. RTS. L. Rv. 71.
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jurisprudence saw, protects only the core of property interests against
arbitrary, abusive and discriminatory state measures.2° Several cases
indicate that taxation is in fact covered by this provision;21 however, thus
far, no case has dealt with a situation involving a post-privatization special-
industry tax that recoups part of the profit arising out of favorable
developments in and outside the privatized industries. An analysis of
extensive case law demonstrates that protection is granted against abusive
measures of tax enforcement, rather than against the exercise of tax
powers. 2 The Convention and its origin are deeply anchored in attitudes
where state tax powers are considered to be at the core of sovereignty, with
minimal acceptance by states of international law constraints in this field. 3
One would need to show an "excessive burden" or a "fundamental
interference" with a financial position.24
2 Thus, in Hentrich v. France, the court rejected the applicant's contention that the
government's exercise of the right of preemption in ascendance with a general tax code was
arbitrary and as such served no public interest. It held that the notion of "public interest" is
necessarily extensive and that member states have a certain margin of appreciation to frame
and organize their fiscal policies and make arrangements -- such as the right of preemption -
- to ensure that taxes are paid. See Hentrich v. France, App. No. 13616/88, 18 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 440, 457-60 (1994) (Court Report). See also National & Provincial Building Soc'y, v.
United Kingdom, App. Nos. 21319/93, 21449/93 & 21675/93, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 127, 149
(1998) (Court Report); GasusDosier-undFordertechnik v. Netherlands, App. No. 15375/89,
20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 403, 426 (1995) (Court Report); James Case, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 456; but
see Pine Valley Devs. v. Ireland, App. No. 12742/87, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 319, 338-41 (1991)
(Court Report). See J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 140-49 (Gillian M. White ed., 1988); LUKE CLEMENTS,
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: TAKING A CASE UNDER THE CONVENTION 204-05 (1994);
YOUNGS, supra note 14, at 199-200; Yves Winisdoerffer, Margin of Appreciation and
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, 19(1) HUM. RTs. L.J. 18 (1998); Jereon. Schokkenbroek, The
Prohibition of Discrimination in Article 14 of the Convention and the Margin of
Appreciation, id. at 20; Thomas W. Waelde & A. Kolo, Multilateral Investment Treaties and
Environmental Expropriation of Foreign Investment (1999) (unpublished paper, on file with
author -- to be published in INT'L & COMP. L.Q. in 2000).
21 See Wasa Liv Omsesidigt, et al v. Sweden App. No. 13013/87, 58 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 163, 177 (1988); decision on admissibility of Appl. No. 350 0168, C.D. 37, p.
44, and No. 5/69/71, C.D. 42, p. 137 cited by Z. NEDJATI, HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION 217 (North-Holland Co., Amsterdam, 1978); Davis, supra note 14.
2 Wasa Liv Omsesidigt, 58 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 177; Gudmundssm v.
Iceland, 1960 Y.B. Eur. Comm'n on H.R. 394 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.); ALBRECHT, supra
note 3, at 170-75.
23 CLIVE PARRY ET AL., PARRY & GRANT ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 389 (1986).
24 Gudmundsson, 1960 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. at 394; Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. Eur.
Cony. on H.R. 182-84, 512 (Eur. Comm'n H.R.); v. Iceland, Appl. No. 511/59, Yearbook
III, p. 394, in which a law imposing a special progressive tax of between 15 to 25 percent on
properties above certain value was held not to violate Article 1 of Protocol I because it was
a measure to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of Article 1; the Greek Case, Yearbook XII, pp. 182-84, 512; Appl. No. 4338
169, C.D. 36, pp. 79, 81; Appl. No. 6202/73 v. The Netherlands, D.R. 1, pp. 66, 71. A.
ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 121-24 (Manchester Univ. Press, Manchester, 2d
ed., 1977).
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Under such rules, one would have to show a very severe and
disproportionate interference with economic assets. Although the windfall
tax as announced by the government was a one-off payment, and not a tax
that might drive any of the utilities to bankruptcy or closure, nevertheless it
was significant in terms of the amount to be realized or paid by the affected
companies. The relevant question regarding the tax is: was it proportionate
to the aim sought to be achieved? In other words, was a fair balance struck
between the general interest of the community and the protection of the
companies individual rights. Although a government may be legitimate in
initiating and pursuing a welfare program that helps people return to work,
why should the privatized utilities (which are themselves employers of
high number of people apart from being also tax payers that contribute in
sustaining the welfare state) be targeted and made to bear what is clearly a
disproportionate burden over and above that of other companies and
businesses in the country. One may argue that the government could have
achieved its aim in a less drastic manner by increasing general taxation or
by levying a corporate tax, rather than imposing an "individual and
excessive burden" on the privatized utilities.' On the other hand, one
could argued that given the wide discretion states have in tax matters and
the fact that the privatized utilities could have perceived the possibility of
the tax should the Labor Party come to power (therefore had assumed the
risk) plus the flexibility of the "reasonable proportionality" test, it is
improbable that a fair balance had not been struck as required under the
convention." If the windfall levy is seen as discriminating against foreign
and national investors, the ECHR institutions are more likely to take a
critical look at the levy than if they were imposed with as much equality as
possible and with the intention and effect to avoid protectionism and
But in a number of cases, the court has held that where the particular individual or group
was made to bear an excessive burden above that of the community or where the measure
"fundamentally interfered" with the right of possession, it might amount to a violation of the
Article. See the opinion of the Commission in Agrotexim v. Greece, App. No. 14807/89, 21
Eur. H.R. Rep. 250, 273 (1995); National Provincial, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 172; Hentrich, 18
Eur. H.R. Rep. at 471.
25 Richard A. Epstein, Taxation, Regulation and Confiscation, 20 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
433 (1982); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 283-305 (1985); Calvin R. Massey, Takings and Progressive Rate Taxation, 20
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 85 (1996).
26 The principle of proportionality which is said to be inherent in the convention requires
that the measure adopted does not only pursue a legitimate objective, it must also maintain a
fair balance between the demands of the general community and the requirements of the
protection of the private individual's fundamental rights. This has been interpreted to mean
that there must a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed
and the aim sought to be realised by any measure depriving a person of his possession. See
The James Case, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 456; Pine Valley, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 338-39;
Hakansson & anor. V. Sweden, (1986) 8 EHRR 329. P. VAN DUK ET AL., THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 638-43 (Kluwer, The Hague,
3d ed., 1998).
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maintain a level playing field.2 7 Similarly, while tax retroactivity has not
yet been a situation before the ECHR institutions, it might well lead to a
more severe judgment. Under the law of the European Community and its
underlying constitutional principles, retroactive legislation is only
authorized to a limited extent if legitimate expectations are protected.28
While EC law does not pertain directly to the UK tax measures envisaged
or to the European Convention on Human Rights, legislation with
27 Although the concept of discrimination is difficult to apply in practice, the
jurisprudence of the ECHR institutions suggests that the term refers to a dissimilar treatment
of like situations or similar treatment of unlike situations, a "difference in treatment that has
no objective and reasonable justification." See Van Raalte v. Netherlands, App. No.
20060/92, 24 Eur. H.R. 503, 513 (1997) (Commision Report) (1997); Pine Valley, 14 Eur.
H.R. Rep. at 341-42; Fredin v. Sweden, App. No. 12033/86, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 784, 797
(Court Report).
Under this rule, the windfall tax was not discriminatory against the privatized utilities
vis-A-vis other private businesses as they could not be said to be within the same category;
for as the court noted in the Belgian Linguistic Case, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 34 (1968),
Article 14 does not guarantee complete equality of treatment. It only forbids a distinction
which has no objective and reasonable basis. See also National & Provincial Bldg. Soc'y,
25 Eur. H.R. Rep., at 127 (the Commission stated that to amount to discrimination under
Article 14, "it must be established that other persons in an analogous or relevantly similar
situation enjoyed preferential treatment; and that there is no reasonable or objective
justification for this distinction."). Stephen Livingstone, Article 14 and the Prevention of
Discrimination in the European Convention on Human Rights (1997), p. 25; NEDJATI, supra
note 21, at 228-32.
On the other hand, it might be argued that the exclusion of National Grid from payment
of the tax did probably amount to discrimination against the other utilities (especially the
water and electricity companies) as they were privatised along with the National Grid, unless
some reasonable reason could be given for the differentiation. See Darby v. Sweden, App.
No. 11581/85, 13 EuR. H.R. L. REv 774 (1991); see also Clements, supra note 20, at 205.
21 Under this principle, it might be argued that by investing in the privatization project
the shareholders of the privatized utilities had hoped (just like any other private investor)
that their investment-backed expectations will not be frustrated by ex post facto regulation;
the more so as the privatized utilities were already tightly regulated by the regulatory
authorities and the areas of regulation include prices and tariffs they could charge customers
(and there have been numerous cases of price cuts following demands by the regulators) and
other social obligations, all of which affect the profits of the companies. See G. Yarrow,
Dealing with Social Obligation in the Telecoms, in REGULATING UTILITIES: A TIME FOR
CHANGE? 67 (S. Sayer et al. eds., 1996).
Although the principle of legitimate expectation is not expressly mentioned in EU laws
nonetheless it is regarded as a general principle of EU law as well as member states'. See J.
SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, at 937-1172 (1992). In relation to Article I
Protocol 1, the principle seems implicit from the decision of the court in Fredin v. Sweden,
13 Eur. H.R. Rep., at 796. On the other hand, it might be argued that by investing in the
privatized utilities in which the government retained extensive regulatory power, the
shareholders could be said to have known and assumed the risk of regulatory changes
including possible additional taxes. Indeed, the then government did make it clear in some
of the privatization prospectuses, the position of the Labour Party on the privatizations; and
the regulatory regime was made part of the privatization condition. See Chennells, supra
note 10, at 280-81; Tony Prosser, SocialLimits to Privatization, 21 BROOK J. INT'L. L. 213,
221-22 (1995); Currie, supra note 10, at 14-15; Antony Barnet, In the Teeth oftheWindfall,
THE OBSERVER, June 1, 1997, at 21.
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retroactive effect is seen as abhorrent to most (in particular Continental
European) lawyers. A windfalls tax which is directly or indirectly
retroactive, and thus imposed upon tax payers without the possibility of
adjusting their behavior to tax imposition, might not fare well in a
balancing test employed by the ECHR.29
Hence, the very pro-state nature of the First Protocol of the ECHR that
protects property challenges the windfall tax on an uphill battle.
Nevertheless, if standards such as discrimination, retroactivity, protection
of legitimate expectations are applied, the balancing test may come out
against the tax. Also, indications that the previous government induced
investors with credible promises of stability might reinforce the "legitimate
expectations" of investors to be weighed against the very explicitly
recognized powers of the state to regulate and tax property. There is also
the off-chance possibility that the currently prevailing philosophy of open
markets requiring extensive protection of property against state
interference and taxation -- as more explicitly recognized in modem
investment treaties - might lead to a modernized interpretation of this
rather old convention. 0 In that case, the breach of promises and the
imposition of a tax discrimination between a particular, privatized industry
and the general business taxes applicable, in other words the attempt to
renegotiate a deal ex-post, after the investors have sunk their monies, could
result in the balancing test under the ECHR to come out against the
windfall tax. However, this outcome is unlikely. Finally, it should be
noted that while the ECHR protects member state nationals (including UK
companies and citizens), it does not apply to US companies or US citizens.
The US purchasers of UK energy companies can not rely on the
Convention because the US is not a member state.
IV. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
The EC quasi-constitutional rules restraining application of retroactive
law are not directly applicable to UK taxation. What is applicable is
directly effective EC law prohibiting discrimination between UK and EC
" The principle of 'legal certainty' -- under which a person subject to a law is entitled to
know what that law is and be able to plan his affairs in such a way as to take account of it --
is a well recognized under EU law. Hence retrospective legislation is generally frowned at,
and even in the UK courts try not to give effect to such legislation. See Davis, supra note
14, at 15-16; M. BREALEY & M. HosKNs, REMEDIES IN EC LAW: LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE
ENGLISH AND EC CouRTs 16 (Longman, London, 1994); BuTTERwORTH'S GUIDE TO THE EU
237 (J. Monar et al. eds., Butterworths, London, 1996); SCHWARZE, supra note 27, at Ch. 6;
Dawn Oliver, Retrospective Validation of Regulations: Who's with the Building Societies?,
5 BRIT. TAX REv. 301 (1992).
30 In this sense also Condorelli, op.cit. supra, who emphasizes the shift towards greater
limitation on the power of states to intervene in property rights which has started to emerge
since significant cases from 1982 onwards.
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nationals (inclusive companies) under Articles 7 and 52," state aids
(Articles 92-94) of the EC Treaty.3" These rules can be raised by private
investors and companies before a UK court which would have to submit
questions of relevant EC law to the European Court of Justice. Similarly,
the European Commission would have powers to investigate breaches of
EC law, with ultimate jurisdiction for the European Court of Justice in
Luxembourg. There is a prohibition on tax discrimination in Article 95 of
the EC Treaty, but this prohibition only applies to "products" from other
member states, and not to investment by member states nationals.33 The
legal opinions prepared by Labor and Conservative party counsel take,
predictably, two routes: The -- easy -- Labor Party position is that there is
no evidence that the windfall tax would discriminate against investors from
other member states (both shareholders in the privatized utilities and
corporate purchasers, e.g. Lyonnaise des Eaux). Similarly, their argument
is that there has not been a case where a tax on a specialized industry has
been considered as a "state aids" for those parts of an industry not taxed
requiring consent by the European Commission.3" The Conservative
Party's counsel's argument needed to be much more imaginative: They had
to argue that while such cases may not have arisen, one could not exclude
that the windfall tax levy would result in discrimination against EC
investors forbidden under the EC Treaty; their main argument was that it
was very difficult to draft a non-discriminatory tax in the first place so
anything that would come out would be likely to be discriminatory in some
fashion. For applying the state aids' prohibition, they suggested that not
taxing a segment of the industry would in fact be the same as providing a
subsidy to this industry seen increasing, in effect, its competitive position
vis-a-vis its taxed competitors.35
" Discrimination may be "manifest" or "hidden" (i.e. in law or practical effect of the
law) both of which are prohibited under EU law. See Case 330/91, R. v Commissioners of
Inland Revenue ex parte Commerzbank AG, STC 605 (1993); Case 80/94, Wielockx v.
Inspecteur de Directe Belastingen, STC 876 (1995); Case 279/93, Finanzamt Koln-Altstadt
v. Schumacker, STC 306 (1995); Commission v. French Republic, 1986 E.C.R. 273;
Timothy Lyons, Discrimination Against Individuals and Enterprises on Grounds of
Nationality: Direct Taxation and the European Court of Justice, 6 BRIT. TAX. REv. 554
(1994); SCHWARZE, supra note 28, at 549-626; Davis, supra note 14, at 15.32 THEECONOMIST, December 7, 1996, pp. 30-3 1.
31 See Case C-213/96, Outokumpu v. Piiritullikarnari, E.C.R. 1-1777 (1998) [hereinafter
Outokumpu] in which the ECJ found discriminatory a customs duty charged by Finland on
imported electricity because it did not give the producers the same benefit of lower duty as it
did to domestic producers whose method of production was less damaging to the
environment; see also Case 171/78, Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, E.C.R. 447
(1980).34 See the Joint opinion of Beloff & Singh, In the Matter of the Labour Party and the
Windfall Tax, February 12, 1997, with summary in THE FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 13, 1997.
35 Joint opinion of Barling, Flynn & Stratford, Proposed Windfall Tax, January 11, 1997,
summarized in THE FINANCIAL TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1997, at 5.
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Both arguments do not lack imagination and some persuasion, but they
are not utterly convincing. First, it would be difficult to see why the
Commission services and the European Court of Justice would want to
extend the state aids concept to a new situation where tax-raising, and
partly re-working a privatization deal, are the main motivating forces, and
not strengthening the competitive position of domestic industry vis-a-vis
foreign competitors. In fact, non-UK utilities not subject to the windfall
tax will benefit since their UK rivals ability to expand internationally will
be curtailed by the UK tax. The UK tax, rather than helping UK utilities in
European or international competition, will rather obstruct their
competitive strategies abroad, and may even weaken them in domestic UK
take-over games. Non-UK investors may benefit from tax credit or tax
deductibility provisions at home in ways not open to purely UK-based
companies and investors so that the UK tax may in fact benefit the relative
competitive position, rather than negatively discriminate, against European
companies. If the tax were structured so as to hit in particular hard at
European investors in the UK, while benefiting UK investors (e.g. Mercury
or some already earlier private and not privatized water utilities), then the
argument of discrimination, and perhaps even state aids, would have some
strength. But the tax seemed to have been motivated and structured not for
protectionist, but primarily for revenue-raising reasons.3 6
V. GATT/WTO
The Conservative Party's counsel has raised the prospect of
GATT/WTO procedures -- presumably brought by the home state of a
foreign utility company the UK subsidiary of which is subject to the
proposed windfall tax. It is hard, though, to develop this line of attack
effectively: GATTIWTO deals with trade. No indication has so far
surfaced that the windfall levy did obstruct trade of, say, electricity (e.g.
Electricite de France) or gas (e.g. Statoil) and imposed discriminatory taxes
on such trade (forbidden under GATT and Article 95 of the EC Treaty).37
It was meant to take money away from the privatized utilities and thereby
reduce the value of the shares of shareholders (with the stock market
already having factored in the windfall levy in the then current stock
market price).38 Trade was thereby not affected; to the contrary, if the UK
utilities were placed in a financially weaker position, this would have made
it more difficult for them to resist import competition and to build up an
export position in other European countries. The GATT/WTO reference is
too far-fetched.
36 THE EcONoMIsT, supra note 12, at 3 8; Chennells, supra note 10.
17 Outokumpu, supra note 33.
" In fact the announcement of the levy did not affect the share prices of the companies
on the stock market mainly because the £5.2 billion the government expected to realize from
the tax did not come as a surprise to the capital market, rather it was the list of the affected
companies that was unpredicted. See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 12, at 58.
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VI. CUSTOMARY AND TREATY-BASED INTERNATIONAL LAW
The most potent challenge, in our view, could be based on customary
and Treaty-based international law. Customary international law on
nationalization and other squeezes on foreign investment were challenged
in the 1970s by the Third World.39 However, the collapse of Communism
and the re-orientation of global economic attitudes towards open and
competitive markets and liberalization of foreign investment conditions --
spearheaded very much by Great Britain -- has led to a substantial
enhancement of the concepts of investment protection.0  Customary
international law, though, would not give a right to challenge the windfall
tax to UK nationals, but exclusively to foreign investors, mainly the US
and some European utilities and private investors who invested heavily in
the Thatcher-led privatization of the UK utility industry, trusting that
privatization, the newly established regulatory framework and economic
buoyancy would lead to financial results beyond those envisaged when the
price for privatization assets was set -- a high-risk investment gamble that
paid off with many,4 1 but not all UK privatization's and which has led in
other privatization cases to unfavorable results. Customary international
law, though, needs a proper plaintiff: Private investors can in the main not
challenge a UK windfall tax directly since they have no access to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ - The Hague) which acts exclusively as a
court for voluntary submission of disputes between states. We understand
that there may be the possibility for the US to bring a claim against the UK
for a breach of international investment rules against US investors in
privatized UK utilities.42
But does customary international law include a prohibition against
measures such as the windfall tax?
In a first round of analysis, there would not be much strength in such
claim: Customary international law protects against nationalization and
confiscation without full, prompt and effective compensation. 3 Therefore,
39 BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 144-48; B. Weston, The Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States and the Deprivation of Foreign-Owned Wealth, 75 AJIL 437 (1981); E.
Arechaga, State Responsibility for the Nationalisation of Foreign-Owned Property, I I
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. (1979).
" On the historical evolution of foreign investment regimes, see Thomas W. Waelde,
Requiem for New International Economic Order, in Liber Amicorum I. Seidl-Hohenvldem
(Kluwer, The Hague, 1998) 771; K. Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalisation and the
International Investment Regime, 19 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 373 (1978); Norton, supra note 9, at
383-44; SORNARAJAH, supra note 6, at 8-20.
41 p. SAUNDERS & C. HARRIS, PRIVATISATION AND POPULAR CAPITALISM (Open Univ.
Press, Buckingham, 1994).
42 Under Article X of the US-UK Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1948, either of
the contracting parties may espouse the claims of its national against the other party arising
from contracts or concessions either before the ICJ or any other mutually agreed dispute
settlement tribunal. See UN Treaties Series, 1948, p. 263.
4' FOIGHEL, supra note 4; Rudolph Dolzer, Expropriation and Nationalisation, 8 ENcY.
PUB. INT'L L. 214 (1985); R. LILLICH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY
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re-nationalization of the privatized utilities would have been perfectly
legal, provided full compensation was paid (although considerable
difficulties would be encountered in determining the amount of
compensation). But the UK government's windfall tax was a much less
intrusive measure. It left proprietary title intact, and so far no evidence has
surfaced indicating that such a tax would have been tantamount to
expropriation. There is, however, the concept of "confiscatory taxation"
and "creeping expropriation":' In essence, taxation so extensive it is
equivalent to confiscation taxation which more or less taxes away the
economic value of the asset at issue. This is "tantamount" to
expropriation." The idea is that a state can not circumvent the
nationalization/compensation rule by depleting the economic value of an
asset while merely leaving title and the formal trappings of legal ownership
intact. For example, the US-Iran claims tribunal decisions have clarified
that a state action -- even if formally only of a regulatory character and not
a formal "taking" away of the proprietary title -- can amount to
confiscation invoking the obligation to pay full compensation.46
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Manchester Univ. Press, Manchester, 1984); L. SOHN & R. BAXTER,
RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY TO INJURIES TO ALIENS (Sijhoff,
Leyden, 1974).
" Bums Weston, "Constructive Takings" under International Law: A Modest Foray into
the Problem of "Creeping Expropriation", 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 103, 106 (1975); see also
HIGGINS, supra note 5, at 322-54; PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND
THE LAW 501-02 (1995); CYNTHIA WALLACE, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE 259 (1982); G. C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under
International Law?, 1962 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 307, 307.
"s In Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. U.S. Inv. Guar. Program (1978) (Am. Arb. Assoc.),
17 I.L.M. 1321, the tax increase was not in itself found to be expropriatory but breached a
stabilization clause; see also Anaconda Co. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 59 I.L.R. 406
(U.S., Arb. Trib. 1975) (concerning an insurance coverage dispute after the Chilean
government nationalized the copper mining industry and canceled its contract with
Anaconda). But in the unpublished case of Renolds Metals Co. (Guyana) v. Guyana, the tax
increase (in the form of a bauxite levy imposing a 1,630 percent increase over existing tax
levels - i.e. an increase from $0.68 per ton to $11.16 per ton) was in itself found to be
expropriatory even though it was one of a series of actions taken by the government against
the project. See also Kugele v. Polish State (Upper Silesian Arb. Trib. 1932); Com Prod.
Ref. Co. Claim, decision of the US International Claims Commission (1951-4); J. Gillis
Wetter & Stephen Schwebel, Some Little Known Cases on Concession, 1964 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 183, 201 (discussing Hellenic Elec. Rwy. Ltd. v. Greece - the Ten Lepta Charge
Case of 1930 deciding "whether the tax exemption clauses contained in the convention of
1925 exempted the Company from the payment of a special charge on railway tickets
imposed by a Greek law of 1929."); ALBRECHT, supra note 3, at 171-75; VAN RAAD, supra
note 3, at 26-27.46 See CHARLES BROWER & JASON BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-US CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, 369-612
(1988); GEORGE ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-US CLAIMS TRmUNAL, 171-276
(1966); Kolo, supra note 1, at Ch. 3-4. See e.g. Starrett Hous. Corp. v. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. CI.
Trib. Rep. 122 (1983); Tippets v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Eng'r of Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 219 (1984); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Iran, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 121 (1986);
Harza Eng'g Co. v. Iran, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 499 (1982).
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Modem views, including those of the British Judge at the Intenational
Court of Justice, Rosalyn Higgins, or the former German Chancellor's
adviser and Professor at Bonn, Rudolf Dolzer, emphasize that taxation can
be considered as a measure equal to nationalzation if it is particularly
intensive, arbitrary or discriminatory, or if agreements made with investors
are then in effect ex-post and unilaterally revoked by the succeeding
government.4 7 One interesting European Court of Human Rights case is
the Greek Stran Refineries case of 1994 that involved an element of a
retroactive cancellation of a government contract combined with other
elements of arbitrariness and government behavior against legitimate
expectations, led to substantial damages." It is here that one can not
exclude that a challenge of the UK windfall tax may have some chance of
success: While the windfall tax is unlikely to destroy the economic asset
value altogether, there may be elements, such as the retroactive
cancellation of the privatization deals of the prior government that could
cause an international tribunal to modernize the conventional principles of
international investment law and find for the affected investors. The
argument would probably be the following: if a full-fledged nationalization
requires full compensation to be acceptable, then governments can not
bypass this principle by taking a part of the value by special ad-hoc
taxation without paying a pro-rata, proportionate share of compensation.
Also, the principle of proportionality (equally recognized in the European
Convention on Human Rights,49 EC law5° and international law) suggests
that th5 'e energy policies pursued by the UK government may be achieved
The only case decided by the Iran-U.S. Tribunal that relates to taxation is Too v. Greater
Modesto Ins. Assoc., 23 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 378 (1989) (holding that the internal
revenue service's auctioning of the claimant's business in order to satisfy his lawful tax
obligations was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, thus it was not
confiscatory).
47 See HIGGINS, supra note 5; Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation ofAlien Property, I
ICSID REv. FOREIGN INVESTMENT L. J. 41, 41 (1986); Ignaz Seidl-Hoheveldem, Semantics
of Wealth Deprivation and Their Legal Significance, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE
PRESENT AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 218, 238 (D. Dicke ed., 1987).
48 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 293 (1995). A parallel analogy might be drawn (based on
the similar common law tradition between Britain and the United States) from the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (where "the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation lacked the funds to liquidate all of the
failing thrifts during the savings and loan crisis of the 1980's").
49 See The James Case, supra note 26, at 456; Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1976); ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESSES, 235 (1994) (discussing
the Handyside Case); VAN JIDK, supra note 26, at 632-35, 640-43; SCHWARZE, supra note
27, at 704-7.
o See Case 11/70, Intemationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfur- & Vorratstelle fur
Getreide & Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1972 C.M.L.R. 255; Case 114/76, Bela-Muhle
Josef Berfmann KG v. Grows-Farm GmbH & Co. KG, 1977 E.C.R. 1211, 2 C.M.L.R. 83
(1979); SCHWARZE, supra note 28, at 708-866.
1, Note also the references to a "partial expropriation" in ECHR cases discussed in
Condorelli, op. Cit. at p. 981.
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in a less damaging way by changing the regulatory regime, rather than by
the blunt tool of a special ad-hoc industry tax.
To sum up the position of international customary law, there is a
classical view according to which taxation forms the core of sovereign
powers and can not be constrained by international obligation. A modem
view, however, less emphasizes the formal action of government than the
economic and financial effect it has achieved. Here, taxation, particularly
if depriving an investor of the economic value of his asset or if aimed at
revoking a previous agreement resulting in legitimate expectations, can be
seen as the equivalent of nationalization. Foreign, not national, investors
could, under the sponsorship of their home governments, claim
compensation equal to the value of the special tax.
A key question in this context is whether there was some sort of
agreement between the government and the foreign investors. While
British law tends to take a very restrictive view on the legal force of
agreements with governments purporting to bind future governments
(based on the notion of Parliamentary supremacy)52 international lawyers
are likely to give much more weight to such agreements.53 There are
arbitration cases before the World Banks ICSID tribunal, where even
Ministerial declarations, governmental investment prospectuses and similar
promotional literature were held to have led to an agreement between
government and investor.54 An international tribunal would therefore
scrutinize closely the promotional literature used during the British
privatization campaigns to see if there was an identifiable "agreement"
which would make a subsequent special industry windfall levy
inconsistent.
This interpretation is not as far-fetched as it may seem on first glance:
The current windfall levy was not the first case of its kind. In 1974-75, the
then Labor government first intended to nationalize the largely US-owned
offshore oil industry. When faced in informal consultations with the US
government with reference to the International Court of Justice and
international law requirements of full compensation, it decided to back-
pedal and use the somewhat softer option of somewhat coercive
12 See Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v. the King (the Amphitrite Case), 3 K.B. 500, 503
(1921).
11 R. W. Bentham, The Acquisition of Natural Resources Interests by the State in the
United Kingdom and in Interntional Law, 5 J. ENERGY NAT. REsouRcEs & ENVTL. L. 49, 55
(Dec. Supp. 1986).
14 See S. Pac. Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Egypt, 1991 (16) Y.B. COM. ARB. 16 (Int'l
Council Com. Arb. 1991) (an unpublished case postponing judgment until a court ordered
expert can assess the valuation of the properties and potential damages), amended by S. Pac.
Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Egypt, Case ARB/84/3 ICSID (W. Bank 1992), 8 ICSID
REv. FOREIGN INvEsm'ENT L.J. 328 (1993) (awarding claimants the sum of US
$27,661,000); see also Georges Delaume, The Pyramids Stand-The Pharaohs Can Rest in
Peace, 8 ICSID R~v. FOREIGN INvETMmENT L. J. 231 (1993) (discussing S.Pac. Properties
(Middle East) Ltd. v. Egypt).
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renegotiations (sale of participation to the then established British National
Oil Company) and institution of a new tax -- the Petroleum Revenue Tax
(PRT)5 While there is not much analysis and little historical record
available so far, it does seem that US representations based on international
law concepts induced the British government to institute a less intrusive
measure than was originally planned. But there is not only customary
international law, arguable in intergovernmental diplomatic discussions
and before the International Court of Justice, to rely on. All learned
commentators so far have ignored that Britain signed in 1994 -- with 48
other countries and the European Communities -- the Energy Charter
Treaty in Lisbon. This Treaty includes the so far most comprehensive, far-
reaching and innovative regime for protecting foreign investment in the
energy sector. 6 The Treaty was -- for US energy investors in the UK very
regrettably -- not signed by the US, but by the EC countries. EC-
originating investment in the UK energy sector (i.e. not water or
telecommunications) is therefore protected under this Treaty. We consider
that there is nothing in UK law which would keep a UK government from
committing itself -- validly under international law -- to assume the
investment guarantees of the Energy Charter Treaty in favor of foreign
investors. If this view is accepted -- and the judges would not be H.M.
judges, but international arbitrators in an independent setting -- then the
Treaty would be fully applicable to the windfall tax on energy companies
owned by foreign investors.
VII. WHAT IS THE PROTECTION AFFORDED BY THE 1994 ENERGY
CHARTER TREATY?
Not surprising given the sovereignty-focus of most governments,
taxation (on capital and income presumably covering the windfall tax) is
largely -- but not fully -- excluded from the Treaty's scope (Article 21) --
except for an explicit reference to "confiscatory taxation" (Articles 21-13).
It would be up to the arbitrators to determine at which level of intensity and
scope a tax becomes "confiscatory." The windfall levy did not seem to
take away the full economic value of the assets at issue; however, its
character of being, at least in intent and target, retroactive, its special-
industry character intended to effectively ex-post re-determine unilaterally
the sales price of UK privatization's and, possibly, its contravention of --
possible -- promises made by H.M. government during the privatization
campaigns does lend itself to argument that such tax would be tantamount
to expropriation,57 in particular with the view in mind that full-scale
5 CAMERON, supra note 18, at 98-99, 116-37; HIGGINS, supra note 5, at 349-52;
Bentham supra note 53; Daintith & Gault, supra note 18, at 36-37.
56 See Waelde, supra note 9.
57 Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of
Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1129 (1996); Jim Rossi, The Irony of
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nationalization requires full-fledged compensation and that such rule
should not be undermined by the circuitous tax route. There are, naturally,
arguments to the contrary, namely that investors who bought UK energy
shares knew -- or should have known -- that the UK government could not
commit its successors and that the vociferous opposition of the then
opposition Labor Party constituted a political risk that might materialize in
the future.58
A second argument (apparent now that the windfalls tax is known) is
that the tax is actually not a "tax on capital/income," but rather on value
appreciation. If this is so, then other provisions of the ECT (Article 10), in
particular compliance of commitments entered with investors and non-
discrimination are applicable. 9 While it seems harder to make a case for
non-discrimination, it seems easier to make a case that in essence a
commitment -- the sale at a specific price -- is breached and changed
retroactively.6
Whatever the legal merits of this argument -- likely to be advocated by
opponents of the tax and to be criticized by its supporters -- the fact is that
the Energy Charter Treaty provides (Article 26) for a direct right of
aggrieved foreign (member state) investors to litigate against the defendant
government before an international arbitration tribunal, where traditional
notions of Parliamentary supremacy are likely to have less weight that the
values of international trade and commerce, namely sanctity of property
and contract.61
VIII. CONCLUSION: MANAGING THE POST-PRIVATIZATION POLITICAL
RISK
Our discussion has identified the considerable political risk faced by a
foreign investor when buying into privatization when and if the privatized
assets turn out to be profitable. It is easy to construct the "excess profit"
notion when the risk that was present during the privatization process is
ignored and when only subsequent developments, and not the risk nor
failures in other cases of such investment are taken into account. Behind
investment into privatization is often a quite narrow perspective -- fueled
by the promoters and advisers of such deals -- which downplays the
Deregulatory Takings, 77 TEX. L.Rrv. 297 (1998) (book review); contrast with Saul
Levmore, The Case for Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. LEGAL. STuD. 265 (1993).
5' Where the Windfall Blows, THE ECONOMIST, July 5, 1997, at 58 ("Nobody doubted that
a windfall tax on the 'excess' profits of the privatized utilities, to pay for a welfare-to-work
programme, would be the centerpiece of Labour's first budget. The only questions were
how much it would raise and which companies would pay it."); Currie, supra note 10;
Chennells, supra note 10.
s9Paasivirta, in Waelde, supra note 9, at 349-64.
'o See The Greek Stran Refineries Case, supra note 48.
61 Paulsson, in Waelde, supra note 4, at 422; Thomas W. Waelde, Investment Arbitration
Under the Energy Charter Treaty from Dispute Settlement to Treaty Implementation, 12
ARB. It'r'L. 429 (1997).
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considerable political risk. In modem energy privatization, the risk is in
subsequent changes of regulatory regimes and in the use of taxation to re-
define unilaterally the original deal. Traditional international law is not
equipped to deal with these risks since its focus was exclusively the issue
of nationalization and compensation. But modem concepts of international
have evolved to cover under the quite open-ended concept of "creeping
expropriation" many more economic assets against a much more diverse
form of state intervention. These concepts are likely to evolve further, in
particular as indicated by the innovative direct investor-state arbitration
(without prior arbitration agreement) of the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty.
But whatever the status of the still -- and as a rule belatedly --
evolving international law,62 privatization investors would do well to pay
more attention to methods of managing such risk. Some are legal:
obtaining clear legal guarantees, enforceable before international tribunals,
against unilateral future changes of deals made by governments; shifting
the burden of regulatory and special-tax risk on local partners who may be
more suitable for assuming such risk (ideally a state company -- but its
halcyon days have gone). The UK windfall tax will undoubtedly contribute
to new methods of political risk management aimed at dealing with this
particular and possibly in the future not unpopular device of partially re-
writing the terms of privatization. A particular device would be the
extensive use of "stabilization" clauses and specific investment
agreements, subject to international arbitration, to secure a foreign investor
against subsequent abrogation of its rights -- simultaneously a method
whereby a current can impose a lasting commitment on its successor,3 a
thought that is quite inconsistent with the traditional UK notion of
"Parliamentary Supremacy." One wonders if the 1994 Energy Charter
Treaty was not a device for many governments to create a lasting
international commitment binding its successors, even if not always
agreeable to its international business deals.
62 Datty & Boscariol, supra note 11.
63 Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment Commitments:
International Law Versus Contract interpretation, 31 Tax. INT'L. L.J. 215 (1996).
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